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Abstract
U.S. Presidential Executive Order 13141 commits the United States to a careful assessment
and consideration of the environmental impacts of trade agreements. The most direct mechanism
through which trade liberalization would affect environmental quality in the U.S. is through the
composition of industries. Freer trade means greater specialization, increasing the concentration
of polluting industries in some countries and decreasing it in others. We begin by documenting
the substantial shift in U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner industries from 1972 to 1994. We then
use annual industry-level data on imports to the U.S. to examine whether this compositional shift
can be traced to the signiﬁcant trade liberalization that occurred over the same time period, and
we conclude that no such connection exists. A shift toward cleaner industries has also occurred
among U.S. imports, and we ﬁnd no evidence that pollution-intensive industries have been dispro-
portionately affected by the tariff changes.
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discussions.  In recent decades, while United States manufacturing output increased, total 
pollution from manufacturers declined. Much of the decline has been due to a large shift 
in the composition of the U.S. manufacturing sector away from polluting industries and 
toward cleaner industries. During the same period, U.S. tariffs on imported 
manufactured goods declined. These concurrent trends have led many to conclude that 
trade liberalization – “globalization” – has caused the shift in U.S. manufacturing to 
clean industries at the expense of environmental quality in developing countries. In this 
paper we seek empirical support for that claim, using data on tariffs, U.S. imports, 
pollution abatement costs, and industries’ relative pollution intensities. While much 
research has been devoted to studying the effect of environmental regulations on trade, 
we know of no other direct empirical tests of whether trade liberalization has 
exacerbated the tendency for pollution-intensive industries to relocate to developing 
countries. 
  This concern, that trade liberalization leads to a transfer of polluting industries 
to developing countries, has been part of the impetus for widespread protests against the 
World Trade Organization. It has been the motivation for environmental addenda to 
trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and it 
is the subject of President Clinton’s Executive Order 13141, “Environmental Review of 
Trade Agreements.” EO13141 requires that the United States “factor environmental 
considerations into . . . its trade negotiating objectives,” and that the U.S. Trade 
Representative and the Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality oversee analyses 
of the “environmental impacts of trade agreements.” 
  Despite the intuitive appeal of the idea, trade liberalization will not necessarily 
lead to a shift toward cleaner goods production in U.S. manufacturing. Indeed, using 
country-level data, recent work by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) and 
Copeland and Taylor (2003) has shown that increases in the volume of trade can result 
in increased pollution emissions in the U.S. From this they infer that trade liberalization 
could actually shift the composition of U.S. manufacturing toward more polluting 
industries. Our work differs from theirs in that we examine the compositional effect of 
tariff reductions directly using industry-level data, while Antweiler et al. and Copeland 
and Taylor infer the compositional effect indirectly from country-level correlations 
between pollution emissions and trade. As we show, our results support their inference. 
  Trade liberalization can affect the environment through several mechanisms, 
such as interjurisdictional competition to lower standards, transfer of pollution 
abatement technology, cross-border spillovers, or changes to the overall scale of 
economies. But it seems to us that the most direct effect of trade liberalization on the 
environment would be through the composition of industries. Trade liberalization leads 
to specialization, and countries that specialize in less pollution-intensive goods will 
have cleaner environments. 
  In this paper we assess the degree to which the reduction of U.S. tariffs on 
imported goods accounts for the changing composition of U.S. manufacturing toward 
cleaner industries. We do this in three ways. First, in section 1 of the paper, we examine 
the pollution content of U.S. manufactured goods, imports, and exports, in the spirit of 
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longer produced in the U.S. Second, in section 2 we use a regression approach similar to 
Grossman and Krueger (1993) to see whether the tariff reductions of the past several 
decades have exacerbated the “pollution haven” effect. If this is the case, then broad-
based tariff reductions could have caused the compositional shift observed in the data. 
Finally, in section 3 we investigate whether the compositional shift in U.S. industries 
could be due to asymmetric trade liberalization (i.e., larger U.S. tariff reductions in the 
more pollution-intensive industries). Specifically, we use our regression coefficients to 
predict the changes in the composition of U.S. industries that are due to past tariff 
reductions (as well as the changes that would be the result of setting current tariff levels 
to zero). 
  We find that that the tariff reductions over the past several decades cannot 
account for the change in the composition of U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner 
industries. First, imports from other countries do not appear to have replaced the 
domestic production of pollution-intensive goods in the U.S. Second, we find no 
evidence that pollution-intensive industries are disproportionately sensitive to tariff 
reductions. (In fact, just the opposite appears likely.) Finally, while it is true that tariff 
reductions have been greater for polluting industries, that difference explains only a 
small part of the overall shift in U.S. manufacturing.  
 
1. The Pollution Content of U.S. Manufacturing 
 
  The various effects of trade on environmental quality can be divided into three 
components: how trade affects the overall scale of the economy; how trade affects the 
techniques of production, and how trade affects the composition of industries.
1 The 
various parties concerned about trade liberalization’s effect on the environment appear 
to concentrate on the composition  effect: specifically, the concern that trade 
liberalization will result in the creation of pollution havens (countries that specialize in 
polluting industries). Hence we investigate mainly the composition effect and not the 
technique effect. We begin by examining the degree to which the composition of U.S. 
manufacturing has shifted toward clean industries, and how much of that shift can be 
explained by changes in the composition of imports and exports. 
  In order to isolate this composition effect, we need a metric with which to label 
various industries as being relatively “clean” or “dirty.” To that end, we rely on the 
World Bank’s “Industrial Pollution Projection System” (IPPS).
2 The IPPS reports the 
amount of each of 14 pollutants, in pounds per million dollars of value added, that were 
generated from each of 459 four-digit SIC codes in 1987. These data are summarized in 
Table 1. They represent a snapshot of the production techniques as of 1987.  
  Figure 1a demonstrates the degree to which the U.S. industrial composition has 
shifted toward less-polluting industries. The bold line plots an index of total real 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Copeland and Taylor (2003). 
2 See Hettige et al. (1994). 
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are apparent, and overall manufacturing grew by 57 percent between 1972 and 1996.  
 




IPPS Coefficients  
[lbs/$] 
Industries Mean  Std.  dev. Max 
Pollutant (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Air pollution            
     Particulates  448    1.64    8.79    147   
     CO  448    2.67    14.5    202   
     SO2  448    2.47    10.78    140   
     NOx  448    1.63    6.23    67   
     VOC  448    1.38    4.77    85   
     PM10  448    0.89    7.64    108   
Water pollution             
     BOD  321    0.0011    0.0066    0.068   
     TSS  321    0.0069    0.053    0.70   
Toxics                    
     Air  434    1.31    5.31    77   
     Land  434    1.64    7.28    83   
     Water  434    0.204    2.208    43   
Metals             
     Air  317    0.020    0.091    1.24   
     Land  317    0.592    4.50    74   
     Water  317    0.0035    0.310    0.53   
Source: World Bank Industrial Pollution Projection System (Hettige et al., 1994). 
 
  The dotted lines in Figure 1a plot the predicted total emissions of sulfur (SO2), 
suspended solids in water, and hazardous waste, three of the 14 pollutants tracked by 
the IPPS. The predicted pollution levels are calculated by multiplying each 4-digit 
manufacturing industry’s real annual value added by the industry’s IPPS coefficient, 
and then summing across industries to get total predicted pollution for each year. By 
holding the IPPS coefficients constant as of 1987, we are in effect freezing the 
technique of production, and only looking at changes in pollution due to changes in the 
scale and composition of manufacturing. If industrial growth were balanced, and every 
four-digit industry grew by the same 57 percent as did overall manufacturing, then 
predicted pollution would coincide perfectly with manufacturing growth, and grow 57 
percent. The dotted pollution lines would overlie the bold manufacturing line. But 
because relatively pollution-intensive industries shrank, while clean industries grew, the 
total amount of predicted pollution grew by much less than 57 percent over this time 
period. Predicted sulfur grew 21 percent, suspended solids fell 15 percent, and 
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Manufacturing Value Added Haz Waste SO2 Suspended Solids
 
  Table 2 summarizes the data behind Figure 1. The first column presents the 
growth in real U.S. manufacturing value added from 1972 to 1994 (51 percent), 
compared with the predicted growth in each of the 14 pollutants, where the predictions 
are based on the scale and composition of manufacturing, holding technique constant.
4  
  Figure 1a and Table 2 demonstrate the degree to which the U.S. manufacturing 
sector shifted toward cleaner industries. During this same time period, U.S. tariffs fell: 
from 1974 to 1994, the average tariff on manufactured imports to the U.S. fell by over 
50 percent, from over 8 percent to less than 4 percent. Given the steep drop in tariffs, 
combined with the dramatic shift toward cleaner industries, we understand how casual 
observers could conclude that the two trends are related. Indeed, this inference makes 
sense intuitively, since trade liberalization could lead to increased specialization, which 
in turn could result in the U.S. producing cleaner goods.  
                                                 
3 Thirteen of the 14 pollutants tracked by the IPPS grew by less than manufacturing.  The only exception 
was biological oxygen demand (BOD), which had predicted growth of 69 percent.  Of this growth, 49 
percent came from two industries: "chemical preparations n.e.c." (SIC 2899) and "paperboard mills" (SIC 
2631).  These industries grew by 68 and 54 percent, respectively, and had 57 and 32 times the mean IPPS 
coefficient for BOD. 
4 Table 2 uses data only up until 1994, which is the last year of the pollution abatement cost data we use 
later in the paper. 
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non-OECD US  Exports
Pollutant  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Particulates 13.3  103.6  109.4  169.4 
CO 1.9  96.7  113.2  158.6 
SO2 14.8  110.3  119.3  183.5 
NO2 22.8  114.7  117.2  205.2 
VOC 36.4  171.0  177.3  223.3 
pm10 -6.3  51.3  66.0  124.0 
BOD 71.5  95.9  95.3  120.7 
TSS -14.7  66.0  100.7  152.6 
Air toxics  47.8  196.6  197.2  264.3 
Water toxics  34.7  148.4  151.5  273.7 
Solid waste toxics  33.2  159.8  162.7  242.1 
Metals to air  -2.3  89.5  109.9  217.5 
Metals to land  -1.0  81.5  91.6  207.8 
Metals to water  19.8  111.2  135.9  234.9 
Percent change in 
manufactured products  51.1  317.9  344.4  268.8 
 
  If it is true that the composition shift of U.S. manufacturing toward clean 
industries has been caused by tariff reductions, one might expect that the composition of 
imports will have shifted toward dirty industries. Figure 1b investigates the pollution 
composition of imports. The bold line in Figure 1b plots the real value of U.S. imports, 
which grew by 318 percent from 1972 to 1994. The dotted lines plot the predicted 
pollution content of those imports, calculated in the same way as in Figure 1a. We 
multiply the real value of each 4-digit industry’s imports by its IPPS coefficient and 
then aggregate across industries. If the composition of imports remained the same, then 
the dotted lines would overlie the bold imports line (i.e., grow by 318 percent). The fact 
that the dotted lines lie below the imports line indicates that the composition of imports 
to the U.S. has also shifted toward clean industries.  
  The second column of Table 2 summarizes the data behind Figure 1b. Real 
imports grew 318 percent, while the predicted pollution composition of those imports 
grew by markedly less. Of the 14 pollutants tracked by the IPPS, none grew by even 
two-thirds as much as real imports. Figure 1b and Table 2 thus demonstrate that cleaner 
U.S. manufacturing composition is not offset by more polluting imports. Rather, the 
composition of imports has also become cleaner.  
  One potential counterargument to our observation that the composition of 
imports has become cleaner is that the concerns about tariff reductions exacerbating 
pollution havens is based largely on imports from developing countries, not from 
developed countries. To see whether the composition of imports from relatively poorer 
countries has become more pollution-intensive, in Figure 1c we conduct the same 
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of imports from non-OECD countries. The dotted lines again plot pollution predicted 
from the IPPS coefficients, multiplied by their respective 4-digit industries’ imports, 
and aggregated across industries. Again, pollution predicted by the scale and 
composition effects, holding technique constant, grew by far less than overall imports, 
even from poorer countries. Table 2 summarizes these data in column (3). Real imports 
from non-OECD countries grew by 344 percent from 1972 to 1994, but the composition 
of those imports shifted toward cleaner industries. As a result, the pollution predicted 
from those imports grew by far less than 344 percent. 
















US Imports Haz Waste SO2 Suspended Solids
 
  So far we have demonstrated that the industrial composition of U.S. imports has 
become less pollution-intensive, and that the missing polluting industries have not been 
replaced by imports. A remaining piece of the puzzle, then, is to ask what happened to 
the pollution composition of U.S. exports. If the composition of U.S. consumption has 
remained steady, and the composition of U.S. manufactures and imports have become 
cleaner, then the U.S. must be exporting the excess clean manufactured goods.  
  Figure 1d plots the growth in real U.S. exports, and the predicted pollution 
content of those exports, in the same manner as Figures 1a-1c. Here the predicted 
pollution lines also lie below the real exports line, but the shift is much less stark. 
Column (4) of Table 2 presents the data behind Figure 1d. Real manufacturing exports 
grew by 269 percent, and most of the predicted pollutants grew by slightly less. The 
composition of U.S. exports has shifted toward cleaner goods, but this shift is less 
dramatic than the shift that occurred in U.S. manufacturing or imports.  
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US Imports from Non-OECD Haz Waste SO2 Suspended Solids
 















US Exports Haz Waste SO2 Suspended Solids
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manufacturing toward cleaner industries has not been caused by trade liberalization, 
because the shift in U.S. production has not been matched by an offsetting shift in 
imports toward more polluting industries. But this evidence is only indirect. For more 
direct evidence we turn to a regression-based approach, and ask whether tariff 
reductions exacerbate the tendency for polluting industries to be imported in response to 
rising domestic pollution abatement costs. 
 
2. A Regression Approach 
 
  The large and growing literature evaluating the relationship between 
environmental regulations and international trade has until recently found little or no 
effect of environmental regulations on trade, and sometimes even found counterintuitive 
results suggesting that strict environmental regulations increase exports and decrease 
imports. Through the late 1990s, most studies used cross-sections of data, making it 
difficult to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries or industries, and to 
account for the endogeneity of environmental regulations.
5 Recent studies have reversed 
these findings by using panels of data, including industry or regional fixed-effects to 
account for heterogeneity, and instrumenting for pollution regulations to account for 
their endogeneity.
6 
  This literature, however, has had little to say about how free trade agreements 
are likely to affect the environment, the focus here. As mentioned previously, U.S. 
tariffs on imports have fallen, and the composition of U.S. manufacturing has shifted 
toward cleaner goods in recent decades, leading many observers to infer a causality 
between these two trends. However, we know of no direct empirical tests of whether the 
trends are related.
7 
  One problem is that both the economics literature and the public debate have 
blurred two alternative definitions of the “pollution haven effect.” The first is what we 
call the direct effect: jurisdictions that impose strict environmental regulations may 
drive out polluting manufacturers and increase imports of polluting goods. This direct 
effect has been the focus of all of the empirical studies to date. These studies regress 
some measure of economic activity, (such as imports, M) on characteristics of industries 
or jurisdictions, whatever the relevant unit of observation, including the stringency of 
the prevailing pollution regulations: 
 
                                                 
5 Jaffe et al. (1996) summarized the earlier literature, and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) provides an 
update. 
6 See, for example, Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2004). 
7 Antweiler et al. (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2003) explore a slightly different question.  They ask 
how trade (rather than tariffs) affects the environment.  Our work investigates the compositional effect of 
tariff reductions directly (using industry level data), while Antweiler et al. and Copeland and Taylor infer 
the compositional impact indirectly (from country-level correlations between pollution-emissions and 
trade). Nevertheless, we both reach the same conclusion: trade liberalization has not resulted in a 
compositional shift in the U.S. toward cleaner industries.  
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where Pit is a measure of pollution regulations, Tit is a measure of trade restrictions, Xit 
is a set of industry characteristics, and di and vt are cross-section and time dummies. In 
this context, the direct effect of pollution regulations (P) on imports (M) is captured by 
the coefficient β1 in equation (1). Estimation of a negative coefficient on β1 is taken as 
evidence for the existence of a pollution haven effect (i.e., more stringent environmental 
standards result in more imports).  
  Whether such pollution haven effects exist has taken on great importance in 
current policy debates, as the existence of such effects is a potential problem in 
negotiating trade agreements. Specifically, anti-globalization protests (and Executive 
Order 13141), are concerned that international trade agreements, by lowering tariffs 
broadly, may enable polluting industries to avoid strict environmental laws by 
relocating overseas and thus assist in the creation of pollution havens. However, 
estimation of β1 tells us nothing about how trade liberalization will influence the 
composition of industries and hence pollution patterns. Indeed, if equation (1) is 
correctly specified, then trade agreements and tariff liberalization will have no effect on 
the composition of industries unless the trade agreements are asymmetrically 
implemented and result in disproportionately greater tariff reductions in the more 
pollution-intensive industries.
8  
  Many environmental activists, however, are concerned with what we call the 
indirect effect: the effect of trade liberalization on the direct (pollution-haven) effect. 
Implicit in this concern is the assumption that pollution-intensive industries are more 
sensitive to tariff reductions than other industries, and thus a broad-based U.S. tariff 
reduction will result in a compositional shift with relatively large increases in U.S. 
imports of pollution-intensive goods. Technically, if the direct effect is ∂M/∂P, then the 
indirect effect is ∂
2M/(∂P∂T). Empirically, this indirect effect can be measured by 
adding an interactive term to equation (1) to get  
 
(2)   123 i it it it it it i t it M PT P T d v e βββ ′′ ′ =++ ++ + + X γαδ 
 
where β3 captures the indirect effect of pollution regulations on the sensitivity of trade 
to tariffs.  
  Note that we have interacted Tit with  i P , the average pollution abatement costs 
for industry i across all time periods. This means that we are asking whether tariff 
changes have a larger effect on imports for industries whose average pollution 
abatement costs are larger. The independent effect of average pollution abatement costs 
on imports is captured by the industry dummies. We could, of course, have asked a 
                                                 
8 The coefficient on tariffs, β2, is constant across industries and is assumed to be independent of the 
pollution intensity of the industry.  Thus, a symmetric tariff reduction on all manufacturing industries will 
have an equal effect on all industries, and thus no effect on the composition of manufacturing. 
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to which tariffs have a larger effect on imports for industries whose pollution abatement 
costs rose more. Or, we could have interacted  i T  with Pit , which would estimate the 
degree to which increases in pollution abatement costs have a larger effect on industries 
with higher tariffs. We believe, however, that equation (2) best captures the concerns of 
Executive Order 13141 and the WTO protests.
9  
  We estimate versions of equation (2) in which the dependent variable (Mit) is 
annual imports to the U.S., by four-digit manufacturing SIC code. We have two main 
motivations. First, we believe that this interactive effect (β3) is an important test of the 
effect of trade agreements on the environment. One of the chief mechanisms by which 
trade will change environmental quality in various countries is by changing the 
distribution of industries. Countries that host increasingly polluting industries as a 
consequence of liberalized trade will become more polluted, while countries whose 
industrial compositions become less polluting will become cleaner. If a trade agreement 
lowers tariffs on polluting industries, and raises tariffs on clean industries, the 
environmental consequences will perhaps be obvious. More realistically, if a trade 
agreement lowers tariffs across the board, the environmental consequences will depend 
on whether the polluting industries or the clean industries are more responsive to the 
tariff reductions: in other words β3 in equation (2).  
  The policy debate seems to presume that this indirect effect is negative for the 
U.S. – that lowering tariffs will increase imports more in those industries that have 
stricter pollution regulations. This inference assumes that the U.S. is at a comparative 
disadvantage in industries facing stringent environmental regulations and thus, a 
reduction in tariff barriers will result in a relatively greater import surge in these more 
regulated industries. We, however, see no particular reason for this to be true as 
comparative disadvantages can arise from many factors, not just environmental costs.
10 
We test for the interaction anyway, because we believe it to be the underlying 
assumption of so much public debate.  
  The second important motivation for our empirical strategy is that if equation (2) 
is the correct specification, then equation (1) contains an important missing covariate 
that is clearly correlated with pollution abatement costs. The indirect pollution haven 
effect is thus not only important in its own right, as the focus of policy concerns, but it 
may also provide an additional explanation for why early attempts to measure the direct 
pollution haven effect have been biased downwards. 
 
                                                 
9 In section 2.3 below we discuss a sensitivity test, running a version of equation (2) interacting Tit with 
Pit, rather than with 
i P .   
10 A similar point is made by Copeland and Taylor (2003), in which they point out that increased trade 
could shift dirty industries to high-environmental standard (high-income) countries if such countries have 
a comparative advantage in dirty goods production (due, for example, to relative capital abundance, or 
labor costs necessary to compensate workers for poor conditions).    
10
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  Because only the United States has collected pollution abatement cost data for a 
significant period of time, researchers studying pollution havens and trade barriers have 
focused on U.S. imports and exports. This paper, like many before it, starts by 
following Grossman and Krueger (1993) and regressing manufacturing imports by 
industry on industry characteristics, as in equation (1). Data on imports to the U.S. come 
from the NBER Trade Database, documented in Feenstra et al. (2002). Our dependent 
variable (Mit) is imports divided by the value of shipments, taken from the NBER 
Manufacturing Productivity Database (Bartelsman et al., 2000).
11 
  The industry characteristics used include environmental costs, tariffs, capital 
intensity, and human capital intensity. Environmental costs come from the Pollution 
Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey (U.S. Department of Commerce). 
We use the data from 1978 to 1994, the last year the PACE data were collected, and 
focus on pollution abatement operating costs.
12 The PACE data were not collected in 
1987, and were not disaggregated by four-digit SIC code in 1979, so we exclude those 
two years. Our measure of an industry’s environmental costs (Pit) is pollution abatement 
operating costs (U.S. Dept. of Commerce) divided by total materials costs (Bartelsman 
et al., 2000). 
  Tariffs by four-digit SIC code are taken from Feenstra et al. (2002), where the 
tariff rate for each industry is duties paid divided by the customs value of imports. We 
converted the 1989-94 data to the 1972 SIC codes using the Bartelsman et al. 
concordance.  
  Finally, each industry is characterized by its capital intensity and human capital 
intensity. Like Grossman and Krueger we measure capital intensity as one minus 






=−   
 
Human capital intensity is then the total payroll less what would have been paid to 
workers had each earned the average wage of an 18-year-old worker with less than a 
high school education, all divided by the value added in the industry:  
 
(4) 




=   
                                                 
11 It should be noted that we strictly follow Grossman and Krueger (1993) in using gross imports (not net 
imports) as our dependent variable.  This is due to the fact that we are estimating the effect of unilateral 
trade liberalization by the U.S. on its imports (i.e., we do not have foreign tariff data to measure the 
corresponding effect of foreign tariff liberalization on U.S. exports). 
12 After 1987 the data switch from the 1972 SIC codes to the 1987 SIC codes.  We used the concordance 
in the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database to reallocate pollution costs to 1972 industry 
definitions. 
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Income data come from the Current Population Survey, May supplemental surveys. 
  Table 3 presents summary statistics of these data. There are 394 industries, and 
15 years of data (1978-1994, less 1979 and 1987 when the PACE data are unavailable). 
Many 4-digit SIC codes are not reported in the 4-digit PACE data, partly to prevent 
disclosure of confidential business information. We have omitted these missing 
observations, resulting in a sample size of 4409.
13 The average U.S. manufacturing 
industry imported 17 percent of the value shipped by domestic producers, divided about 
evenly between OECD countries and the rest of the world. The average industry spent 
1.1 percent of total materials costs on pollution abatement operating costs, ranging from 
zero to 18 percent. Tariffs averaged 4.0 percent, ranging from zero to over 40 percent. 
The question we ask is whether those industries whose tariffs dropped most saw larger 
increases in imports if their environmental costs were high.  
 
Table 3: The Data 
  
Means 
(std. dev.)  Max 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable:  




  From OECD countries   0.085 
(0.261) 
12.1 
  From non-OECD countries   0.084 
(0.231) 
7.1 
Environmental cost   0.011 
(0.015) 
0.176 
Tariff    0.040 
(0.040) 
0.41 





Human capital   0.275 
(0.092) 
0.99 
Physical capital   0.612 
(0.120) 
0.95 
Observations 4,409   
Number of industries  394   
 
                                                 
13 We have run all of the specifications below with the missing environmental cost data treated as zeros, 
with no change in the substantive conclusions.  Coefficients' magnitudes change, but not the pattern of 
signs nor statistical significances. 
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  Table 4 begins with a basic fixed-effect regression of import penetration, by 
industry, on industry characteristics from 1978 to 1994. It is a panel-data version of 
Grossman and Krueger (1993), as represented by equation (1). Industries whose 
environmental costs increased also saw their imports increase, and industries whose 
tariffs increased saw imports decrease.
14 Equally sensibly, higher capital intensity and 
human capital intensity are associated with lower imports.  At the bottom of Table 4 we 
have calculated the elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs (-0.44) as a useful 
benchmark to compare with later specifications and samples. It suggests that a 10 
percent increase in tariffs is associated with a 4 percent decline in imports. 
 
Table 4: Baseline Regressions 
 
Dependent variable:  













Tariff × Avg. env. cost   50.6* 
(12.4) 








Observations     4,409  4,409 
Number of industries        394  394 
R-squared 0.91  0.91 
Elasticity of imports with 
respect to tariffs 
-0.436 -0.382 
Chi-sq. from Hausman test 
of fixed versus random 
effects 
14.3 124.7 
Notes to Table: The regressions are estimated with year and industry fixed effects, 
and cover the period 1978-94 (1979 and 1987 are omitted due to missing data).  The 
dependent variable is gross imports divided by value shipped. 
* statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
  In column (2) of Table 4 we include an interaction term, as in equation (2). Our 
interpretation of public rhetoric, and EO13141, is that the coefficient (β3) on this 
interactive term is expected to be negative. However, in practice the coefficient (50.6) is 
                                                 
14 The fact that the coefficient on the environmental cost variable is positive and statistically significant is 
consistent with recent literature that uses time series data and fixed effects, and departs from previous 
efforts (such as Grossman and Krueger) that relied on a single cross section.  
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tariff reductions rather than more sensitive, and trade liberalization does not exacerbate 
the pollution haven effect.
15  
  If we take the point estimates from column (2) seriously, and calculate the 
elasticity of import penetration with respect to environmental costs at the average level 
of tariffs, that elasticity is -0.38. Though this number is not markedly different from the 
tariff elasticity when the interaction term is omitted (-0.44), the important point is that 
the interaction term is positive, so that as we consider industries with lower pollution 
abatement costs, this estimated elasticity shrinks in absolute value.  
  We conclude from Table 4 that in general, tariff reductions from 1978 to 1994 
did not significantly increase imports more from polluting industries than from clean 
industries. In fact, the opposite is more likely to be true: if anything, trade liberalization 
has shifted U.S. industrial composition toward dirtier industries, by increasing imports 
of polluting goods by less than clean goods.  
  In previous work, we explored the possibility that environmental regulations 
have different effects on trade with developing countries than they do on trade with 
developed countries (Ederington et al., 2005). It seems plausible that the same forces 
are at work here. Trade agreements may alter the pollution intensity of trade between 
the U.S. and developing countries, but not with other developed countries.
16  
  To test whether trade agreements have increased imports in pollution-intensive 
industries from developing countries, in Table 5 we run versions of equations (1) and 
(2) separately for OECD and non-OECD countries. The coefficients are smaller than for 
the whole sample because the scale of the dependent variable is smaller: imports from 
OECD divided by U.S. value shipped. Hence comparisons can be made only by 
examining the relevant elasticities. In column (1) of Table 5, without the interaction 
term, the elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs (-0.15) is smaller for OECD 
countries than for all imports. Most importantly, as with the full sample, the interactive 
term in column (2) of Table 5 is still positive and statistically significant. 
  The real test, however, comes with imports from non-OECD countries, where 
the concern about pollution havens is strongest. Once again the interactive term 
between tariffs and pollution costs remains positive and statistically significant. The 
point estimate (31.7) implies that tariff reductions have had a smaller effect on imports 
from non-OECD countries in the more pollution-intensive industries. The interacted 
coefficient in column (4) has exactly the opposite sign to what we perceive to be the 
conventional wisdom. Rather than the U.S. manufacturing sector becoming cleaner at 
the expense of the manufacturing sector in developing countries, column (4) suggests 
                                                 
15 This result, that polluting industries are less sensitive to tariff reductions, is consistent with previous 
work (Ederington, Levinson and Minier, 2005), in which we show that polluting industries are less 
geographically footloose than clean industries.  This would make them less sensitive to changes in tariffs 
as well as to changes in pollution regulations.   
16 Intuitively, if the U.S. is at a comparative disadvantage in dirty goods production (due to high 
regulatory standards) against developing countries but not other developed countries, then trade 
liberalization might only result in large increases in polluting imports from the developing world.    
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Table 5: Trading Partners’ Environmental Standards 
OECD Non-OECD  Dependent variable:  
gross imports / value shipped  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







 0.58*  
(0.21) 












   31.7* 
(8.8) 


















Observations  4,409  4,409 4,409 4,409 
Number of industries  394  394  394  394 
R-squared  0.94  0.94 0.85 0.85 
Elasticity of imports with 
respect to tariffs 
-0.146  -0.109 -0.723 -0.653 
Notes to Table: The dependent variable in each regression is gross imports divided by value shipped to 
specified trading partners (OECD countries in columns 1 and 2, non-OECD in columns 3 and 4). All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects.  
* Statistical significance at the 5% level.  
† Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
2.3 Democracy, Endogeneity, and Other Concerns 
 
  A number of readers have speculated that trade liberalization might have a larger 
effect on imports from dictatorships than from democracies. The intuition may not be 
explained by any formal trade theory, but rather by the notion that an oppressive 
government has a comparative advantage in that citizens with fewer civil liberties 
cannot vote for environmental policies and workplace safety laws that raise production 
costs. We have estimated a version of Table 4 separately for dictatorships and 
democracies, as defined by the Freedom House (2004) index of political rights, which is 
commonly used in empirical studies involving democracy.  Freedom House assigns 
countries an index value from 1-7.  The typical classification is that countries indexed 
1-2 are “free,” and those indexed 6-7 are “not free.”  
  Appendix Table A contains a version of the basic specifications.  Column (1) 
uses only imports from "non-dictatorships," with Freedom House indices from 1 to 5.  
The results are essentially the same as for the full specifications in Table 4.  Column (2) 
                                                 
17 This result is actually consistent with those of Antweiler et al., (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2003) 
who, using a different technique, estimate that trade integration has shifted dirty-goods industries to high-
standard (high-income) countries.  (See fn. 7.) 
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direct effects of environmental costs are small and insignificant, but the direct effect of 
tariffs and the indirect effect of tariffs on high-environmental-cost industries are about 
the same as for the full sample. In other words, separating out the dictatorships does not 
change the substantive conclusion that trade liberalization does not increase imports of 
polluting industries any more than clean industries.   
  Another concern raised by many analysts of the pollution haven literature, 
ourselves included, is that regressions of trade flows on pollution costs suffer from 
endogeneity problems. It may be that countries use environmental policy as a strategic 
substitute for tariffs (Ederington and Minier, 2003). Or, it could be that the proxy for 
regulatory stringency, expenditures on pollution abatement, is a function of trade, if 
trade changes the composition of sub-industries within each 4-digit SIC code (Levinson 
and Taylor, 2004).  
  While these issues are not the focus of this paper, in column (3) of Appendix 
Table A we have tried employing the instruments from Levinson and Taylor (2004). 
That paper constructs an instrument based on the geographic dispersion of industries 
throughout the U.S. The idea is that industries concentrated in states whose 
environmental standards increased most will have experienced the highest run-up in 
environmental costs. So long as the geographic dispersion of industries throughout the 
U.S. is unrelated to import penetration, the geographic dispersion will be a good 
instrument for an industry's environmental regulatory costs. (See Levinson and Taylor 
for details.) The current paper represents a slightly different application: four-digit 
industries rather than three-digit industries, the dependent variable is gross rather than 
net imports, the regulatory proxy is pollution abatement cost over the cost of materials 
rather than value added, and the data run from 1974-1994, rather than just 1977-1986. 
Nevertheless, column (3) of Appendix Table A estimates a version in which Pit is 
instrumented using the Levinson and Taylor instruments. The environmental cost 
coefficient (2.86) is larger than in Table 4, but is statistically insignificant in this case. 
(We have fewer years of data and industries.) The interaction term, which is the focus 
of this paper, is smaller (13.7), and statistically insignificant, but still positive. So the 
basic finding from Table 4 survives. Industries whose environmental compliance costs 
are largest are not more responsive to tariff reductions.  
  Because of the concerns about endogeneity, we do not want to interpret the 
results in Tables 4 and 5 causally. Rather, the estimates in Tables 4 and 5 are 
conditional correlations that tell us that imports have increased more in industries whose 
tariffs have fallen the most, but that this conditional correlation is not larger for 
industries that are more pollution-intensive. Trade liberalization does not seem to be 
associated with increased imports from relatively pollution-intensive industries. 
  Finally, some commentators have argued that the correct version of equation (2) 
would interact tariffs Tit with current pollution costs (Pit), rather than with average 
pollution costs (
i P ). In column (4) of Appendix Table A we estimate that alternative 
model. All of the resulting coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from those in 
equation (2) except for the coefficient on Pit alone.  This is because most of the 
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industry variation is soaked up by industry fixed effects, and including the interaction  
PitTit  means there are two right-hand-side variables trying to capture the effect of time-
series variation in pollution costs. 
  In short, the basic result holds for a variety of alternative specifications 
(separating imports from dictatorships, instrumenting for pollution costs, and including 
a time-varying interactive term).  Imports of pollution-intensive goods do not appear to 
be more sensitive to tariff reductions than imports of clean goods. 
 
3. Predicted Pollution Changes 
 
  Tables 4 and 5 examine whether pollution-intensive industries are more 
responsive to broad-based tariff reductions than clean industries, and find just the 
opposite. Thus our estimates imply that symmetric tariff reductions in the U.S. would 
have actually shifted the composition of U.S. manufacturing toward dirtier industries. 
There is, however, an alternative mechanism through which the trade agreements could 
make U.S. manufacturing cleaner. It might be that trade agreements, either past or 
future, are skewed toward pollution-intensive industries. If tariffs fell more for polluting 
industries than for clean industries from 1978 to 1994, then trade liberalization might be 
said to have caused a shift of polluting industries overseas, even if the interactive 
coefficient  β3 in equation (2) is zero. Alternatively, if current tariffs are higher for 
polluting industries than for clean industries, then future trade agreements that lower all 
tariffs to zero might be expected to shift polluting industries overseas. 
  The first thing to note is that on average, industries whose tariffs fell further had 
higher pollution abatement costs than industries whose tariffs rose, or fell by less. 
Specifically, the raw correlation between the change in tariffs from 1978 to 1994 and 
average pollution costs is -0.19, which is statistically significantly different from zero. 
While this correlation is not strong, it lends plausibility to the claim that tariff 
reductions might have caused the shift in U.S. manufacturing composition, because the 
reductions were skewed toward polluting industries.  That said, those industries that 
experienced the very largest tariff reductions are not among the most polluting 
industries.
18  
  To explore the magnitudes of the correlations between environmental costs and 
tariff reductions, in Table 6 we predict the declines in U.S. pollution resulting from U.S. 
tariff reductions from 1978 to 1994 using the coefficients of Table 4. In column (1) of 
Table 6 we list the estimated change in the emissions of the 14 pollutants modeled by 
the World Bank’s Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS) due to scale effects and 
compositional shift in U.S. industries. These are the same data used to generate Figure 
1, but for the shorter time period for which pollution abatement cost data are available. 
                                                 
18 The five industries that have experienced the largest tariff reductions are SIC 2252 “Hosiery, not 
elsewhere classified,” SIC 2322 “Mens’ & boys’ underwear & nightwear,” SIC 2075 “Some fat/oil not 
cottonseed,” SIC 2342 “Bras, girdles, and allied garments,” and SIC 2341 “Womens’ & childrens’ 
outerwear.” 
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amount of pollution generated in each industry in 1978 and then aggregated across all 
industries. We did the same for 1994 and then reported the percentage change between 
1978 and 1994. The numbers differ because industries with varying pollution intensities 
for different pollutants grew by different amounts during the period. 
  As in Figure 1, while the real value of manufacturing output increased by 36 
percent from 1978 to 1994, the predicted pollution either rose by much less, or declined 
outright. This is because the manufacturing industries have shifted toward those that 
produce less pollution. In other words, while manufacturing output increased, predicted 
airborne particulate emissions declined by 6.4 percent because those four-digit 
industries that produce the most particulates declined over the period, while those that 
produced the least increased their output.  
 














from 1994 if tariffs 
set to zero. 
Pollutant  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Air pollution        
     Particulates  -6.4       -31.1  -3.0  -1.6 
     CO  -19.3  -40.6  -1.2  -1.0 
     SO2  -12.7  -35.8  -1.6  -1.5 
     NOx  -5.8  -30.7  -2.3  -2.2 
     VOC  +4.5  -23.1  -3.0  -3.0 
     PM10  -17.5  -39.3  -2.0  -1.3 
Water pollution         
     BOD  +26.9  -6.6  -1.1  -3.8 
     TSS  -29.2  -47.9  -1.4  -1.6 
Toxics               
     Air  +12.8  -17.0  -3.2  -2.3 
     Land  -3.5  -29.0  -1.4  -2.5 
     Water  -4.4  -29.7  -1.1  -1.4 
Metals         
     Air  -21.4  -42.2  -1.7  -1.4 
     Land  -20.9  -41.8  -1.4  -1.0 
     Water  -10.5  -34.1  -1.1  -0.9 
Source: authors’ calculations from World Bank Industrial Pollution Projection System, the NBER 
Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database (Bartelsman et al., 2000), NBER Tariff Data (Feenstra et 
al., 2002). 
 
  To represent the pollution changes in column (1) of Table 6 comparably with the 
predictions from the regression coefficients, in column (2) we report the predicted 
change relative to the change in real manufacturing growth. For example, the decline in 
particulates of 6.4 percent represents a 31 percent decline relative to the 36 percent 
growth in manufacturing. ([1-0.064]/[1.36]-1 = -0.31) This amounts to examining the 
composition effect alone, eliminating both the scale and technique effects.  
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period to ask whether the fact that tariff reductions were steeper in more polluting 
industries could have caused this shift in U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner industries, 
presumably at the expense of other countries’ environmental quality. We used the tariff 
coefficients from column (2) of Table 4, along with the actual industry-level tariffs and 
environmental costs, to predict the changes in imports (as a share of value shipped) that 
resulted from U.S. tariff reductions. We then multiplied this result by the actual value 
shipped in each industry, to get the predicted change in imports. We then assumed as a 
benchmark that changes in imports are offset dollar-for-dollar with domestic 
production, so we can multiply the import change by the IPPS coefficients to get 
predicted changes in pollution emanating from each industry.
19 Finally, we aggregated 
these pollution changes across all industries, and divided this Figure total by the total 
estimated pollution as of 1978, to get the predicted percentage changes reported in 
column (3). 
  As column (3) shows, predicted pollution declined only slightly due to the 
varying declines in industry-specific tariffs. Given the degree to which tariffs declined 
over this time period, the predicted effect of this on imports, and the predicted pollution 
associated with each industry, imports are sufficient to replace between 1 and 3 percent 
of pollution generated by U.S. manufacturing. This change is small relative to the 
overall shift in U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner industries demonstrated in column 
(2). Though tariff reductions have been steeper in more pollution-intensive industries, 
that can explain only a small part of the shift of U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner 
industries.  
  There is, however, one last interpretation of the environmental opposition to 
trade liberalization that we can examine with these data. Observers could be concerned 
that  current tariff levels offer more protection to polluting industries than to clean 
industries, and that future trade agreements that lower all U.S. tariffs to zero could 
cause U.S. polluting industries to relocate overseas more than relatively clean 
industries. In column (3) of Table 5 we predict the change in U.S. manufacturing 
pollution that would result from a drop in tariffs from their 1994 levels down to zero. 
For each four-digit SIC code we calculate the level of the 1994 tariffs (from Feenstra et 
al., 2002). We then use the tariff and interactive coefficients from Table 4 to predict the 
change in imports that would result from reducing these 1994 tariffs to zero. We then 
assume as a benchmark that those imports replace U.S. production, and use the IPPS 
pollution coefficients to generate the resulting change in each of the 14 pollutants. As 
column (4) shows, this results in very small changes in pollution relative to actual 
changes over the 1978 to 1994 period. Once again, we find little basis for the fear that 
tariff reductions themselves will generate large shifts in the composition of U.S. 
manufacturers away from polluting industries.  
 
                                                 
19 Note that this exaggerates the pollution changes, because the IPPS coefficients are calculated per dollar 
of value added, and we multiply by value shipped. 
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  The “trade and environment” debate has captured public interest, from the street 
protests outside WTO meetings to President Clinton’s executive order requiring that 
trade agreements be accompanied by environmental impact statements. The general 
consensus seems to be that tariff barriers protect U.S. manufacturers that would 
otherwise move overseas to avoid increasingly strict U.S. environmental standards, and 
that trade agreements, by lowering these tariffs, will disproportionately affect the most 
polluting industries. 
  This story is, on the surface, consistent with recent U.S. experience that has seen 
the U.S. manufacturing sector shift toward cleaner industries. As we show in this paper, 
while manufacturing’s real value added grew by 51 percent from 1972 to 1994, that 
growth occurred mostly among the least polluting industries, causing the estimated 
emissions of most of the 14 pollutants tracked by the World Bank’s IPPS to rise by 
much less than 51 percent, or even to decline. This shift has occurred simultaneously 
with a general reduction in U.S. tariff barriers due primarily to the success of GATT 
negotiations. 
  We show, however, that these two trends appear unrelated. We find no evidence 
that domestic production of pollution-intensive goods in the U.S. is being replaced by 
imports from overseas. In addition, we find that symmetric tariff reductions in the U.S. 
have most likely induced a compositional change toward dirtier industries (not cleaner) 
among U.S. manufacturing. Finally, while polluting industries have experienced larger 
tariff reductions than other industries in the U.S., these differences in tariff reductions 
do not appear to be of sufficient magnitude to explain more than a small fraction of the 
shift in U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner industries.  
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Appendix Table A: Extensions 
 
Dependent variable:  







































Tariff ×Annual env. 
cost 
     54.1* 
(8.2) 

















Observations  4,409   4,393  1731   4,409 
Number of industries  394      393  307      394 
Notes to Table: The regressions are estimated with year and industry fixed effects, and cover the period 
1978-94 (1979 and 1987 are omitted due to missing data).  The dependent variable is gross imports divided 
by value shipped.  "Dictatorships" are defined as counties with Freedom House (2004) indices of 6 or 7 on a 
scale from 1 to 7.  Column (4) uses instrumental variables as in Levinson and Taylor (2004). 
* statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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